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Integrating planning and implementation, by having one agent perform both tasks, may
be eﬀective in encouraging planning activity whose outcome is not observable. Emphasiz-
ing its information generating role, we ￿nd that planning activity is best encouraged by
partially integrating the tasks. This is because the value of information is non-monotonic
in the degree of task integration. Therefore, the threat of using a second agent to im-
plement the project may relax the moral hazard constraint associated with the planning
task. The project size is distorted to increase the value of information, and there can be
over-investment relative to the ￿rst best.1I n t r o d u c t i o n
The planning stage of a project or the development stage in a product cycle often consists
of acquiring information essential for successful implementation, for example, information
about the production environment or project pro￿tability. In many instances this infor-
mation is not contractible, which creates a moral hazard problem in the planning stage.
Furthermore, if the outcome of planning activity is private information of the agent, there
is also a subsequent hidden information problem at the implementation stage. The op-
timal task-design problem would have to address both of these issues simultaneously, and
the impact of the informational content of planning activity on task design has not been
emphasized much in the literature. A notable exception is the insightful paper by Lewis
and Sappington (1997). They argue that it may be optimal to completely separate the
planning and implementation tasks by assigning these tasks to two diﬀerent agents. Their
insight is that information learned in the implementation stage can be used to discipline
the planning agent. Using a hidden-information model with observable cost and an unob-
servable cost-reducing eﬀort, they show that if the payment to the planning agent can be
based on the implementation cost, a principal can costlessly provide incentives for planning
activity as well as truthful revelation of the planning information by fully separating the
tasks.
In this paper, we want to argue that it is also important to study this task design problem
where the principal cannot base the planning agent￿s contract on implementation cost. As
noted by Laﬀont and Tirole (1988) in a related context, it may not be feasible or desirable to
base the planning agent￿s payment on the cost generated by the implementation agent. It
could be the case that implementation takes a long time and it is not feasible to delay paying
or penalizing the planning agent until then. The cost data at the implementation stage can
be subject to manipulation by the principal and the implementation agent at the expense
of the planning agent. In the presence of cost uncertainty and risk aversion or limited
penalties, fully separating tasks may not be optimal. In sum, while the implementation
cost may be a useful incentive device in contracting with the planning agent, in many cases
its scope will be limited.
One way to reward an agent for planning eﬀort is then by integrating the two tasks and
letting the same agent do both. The agent engages in the planning activity anticipating
1information-based rent in the implementation phase.1 This is the same intuition as in the
system of patents, which is also a second best response to reward innovative ideas that can
not be directly traded. The reward for innovation is administered by granting monopoly
rights to the patent holder. In this paper, however, we argue that partially integrating the
tasks of planning and implementation may be optimal since it provides stronger incentive
for acquiring planning information.
To illustrate our ideas, we extend the standard hidden information model developed by
Baron and Myerson (1982), where project size is observable but not project cost. Planning
consists of acquiring information about an implementation cost parameter. In the planning
stage, the agent can shirk, remain uninformed, and yet claim to be informed.2 We show
that partial integration of tasks occurs in equilibrium in that the principal invites a second
agent to implement the project when the cost parameter is above a cut-oﬀ level. For
low costs, increasing the cut-oﬀ level or the region of integration makes planning activity
more attractive, but raising integration above a certain level discourages planning eﬀort by
increasing the payoﬀ from remaining uninformed. This implies that the value of information
to the planning agent from learning the project cost is non-monotonic in the region of
integration, and that partial integration is optimal.
It is well known that in some instances the agent performing R&D also implements the
project, while in others a diﬀerent agent does the implementation. Similarly, a multina-
tional may hire a local agent to carry out preliminary studies of local conditions, and may
or may not send a manager from the center to establish and run their local subsidiary.
Our analysis implies that incentive to acquire information plays an important role in the
replacement decision. Often, the division of tasks seem to occur according to professions,
e.g., primary care physicians or ￿gate keepers￿ and specialists in health care, solicitors and
barristers in the UK legal system, analysts and fund managers. Our results suggest that
the borders of these professions may be determined to some extent by considerations of in-
1See Lewis and Sappington (1997), and CrØmer, Khalil, and Rochet (1998a) for the role of information-
based rent in providing planning incentives.
2Just as in Lewis and Sappington (1993), the possibility of ignorance, if the agent does not acquire
information, introduces a mass point at the mean of the distribution. They show how this has signi￿cant
implications on optimal quantity schedules. We emphasize its role in determining the opportunity cost of
acquiring information, which implies that the value of information function is non-monotonic in the region
of integration.
2formation acquisition. More generally, the roles of the collectors of information may extend
beyond what is implied by the principle of comparative advantage and specialization in the
traditional sense.
We note that our ￿ndings are related to pre-existing results. It has been shown that the
threat of shut-down or termination, especially when a replacement agent is available, can
reduce the cost of inducing information revelation (see e.g., Demski, Sappington and Spiller
(1987) and Sen (1996)). However, these papers do not consider a ￿rst-stage moral hazard
problem, which can make it costly to replace the ￿rst agent. This is shown in the literature
on second sourcing, which considers this ￿rst-stage moral hazard problem as well like we do.
Various authors have shown that termination and replacement may still be optimal but at
the cost of tightening the moral hazard constraint. The possible use of a second source
can discourage ￿rst stage production (Anton and Yao (1987)), investment (Laﬀont and
Tirole (1988)), or R&D eﬀort (Riordan and Sappington (1989)). On the contrary, we show
that separation and replacement can provide stronger incentive for planning activity and
relax the moral hazard constraint when the up-front investment is in information gathering
instead of traditional cost reduction. Thus, introducing another agent for implementation
can relax not only the information revelation constraint but also the moral hazard constraint
in planning activity.
In addition to Lewis and Sappington (1997), discussed already, others have also inves-
tigated the problem of providing incentive to acquire information. Lambert (1986) studies
the problem of providing incentive to a manager to learn about riskiness of projects, and
CrØmer, Khalil, Rochet (1998a) study the properties of production contracts that motivate
or deter information acquisition.3 These papers do not address the issue of task separation.
Hirao (1993) shows that the decision to integrate or separate tasks depends on what the
principal knows about the agent￿s information. Whereas Hirao has found either separation
or integration of tasks to be optimal, we demonstrate the optimality of partial integration.
This is signi￿cant since then the decision to separate or integrate depends on the outcome
of the planning stage, which may be more appealing.
Our message is complementary to that of Arrow (1975), which says that upstream ver-
tical integration may occur to acquire critical planning information. We emphasize the
3Brocas and Carrillo (2004) show that individuals may be willing to acquire information to be able to
in￿uence others￿ decisions.
3need for downstream integration of tasks to encourage upstream units to acquire planning
information. Aghion and Tirole (1997) point out that allocation of authority in an organi-
zation in￿uences an agent￿s initiative or incentive to acquire information, and Dewatripont
and Tirole (1999) argue that creation of advocates for and against issues provides the best
incentive to acquire information when there are competing causes.4
Riordan and Sappington (1987), Baron and Besanko (1992) and Gilbert and Riordan
(1995) show that complementarity of tasks and correlation between private information
in two stages of production can determine if it is optimal to integrate or separate tasks.
Dana (1993) also points out the importance of correlation between private information in
determining the integration of horizontal tasks. These papers do not consider information
acquisition.
The rest of the paper is organized as follows. In section 2, we present the base model.
Section 3 is the main section where we develop the problem faced by the principal and
present the main results. In section 4, we explore some extensions and conclude the paper.
2M o d e l
A principal needs to hire agents to accomplish a project, and we assume all parties are risk
neutral. The project involves two phases or tasks, planning and implementation.T h e
principal may potentially deal with two agents, A1 and A2. If he chooses the same agent
for both tasks, we say that he has chosen task integration. If he chooses one agent for
planning and another for implementation, we say that he has chosen task separation.T h e
principal values the project according to the function V (q),w h e r eq ≥ 0 is the size of the
project. The function V (•) is strictly concave, twice diﬀerentiable on [0,+∞),a n ds a t i s ￿es
the Inada conditions, V 0(0) = +∞ and V 0(+∞)=0 . The cost of the project is βq,w h i c h
is borne by the agent. We can interpret this as the agent￿s cost of eﬀort for implementing a
project of size q, and it depends on the state or environment, which is parameterized by β.
In return for completing the project, the principal pays the agent a non-negative monetary
transfer t.
The parameter β is drawn from the interval [β, ﬂ β] according to the distribution function
4There is also a literature on eliciting information using multiple experts. The classic reference is Crawford
and Sobel (1982) and recent contributions can be found in Wolinsky (2002).
4F(β), with the associated density function f(β), which is diﬀerentiable and strictly positive.
We make the standard assumption that F(β)/f(β) is non-decreasing. Unless otherwise
stated, the expectation operator E[•] will be used with respect to this distribution, and we






Before introducing our model of possible separation of planning and implementation, we
brie￿y present two well-known single-agent benchmarks: the full-information case and the
informed-agent or Baron-Myerson (1982) case. If β is common knowledge at the outset,
the principal implements the eﬃcient project size, denoted by q∗(β),w h i c hs a t i s ￿es the
following condition:
V 0(q∗(β))
def = β ∀β. (1)
The agent receives just his reservation payoﬀ.N e x t , i f β is private information to the agent
at the outset, the principal deals with an informed agent, while his belief on β is common
knowledge and given by F(β). Then the optimal project size, denoted by qb (β), satis￿es
the following condition:
V 0(qb(β))




It is easily checked that qb(β) is non-increasing, qb(β) <q ∗(β) for all β>β , and qb(β)=
q∗(β). As is well known, the agent commands an information rent, and the principal distorts
the project size downward to reduce this rent.
Returning to our model, where all three parties share the same belief F (β) about β,
the principal ￿rst oﬀers publicly observable contracts to A1 and A2. The contract speci￿es
project size and payments, as well as the separation-integration policy based on what the
agent reports after the planning task. The planning task is for A1 to identify the pro￿tability
of a project, which we assume to be determined by the cost parameter β.5 Given the
contracts, A1 decides whether to gather information on β. If he does, it costs him c>0 and
he learns β without error.6 This is his only opportunity to learn the cost parameter β.I f A1
decides not to gather information, he will have to implement the project without knowing
β if he implements the project. This simple and insightful way to model planning was ￿rst
5We argue in the conclusion section that the task design issues we raise remain even if the principal could
introduce ex ante competition to dissipate rent instead of an exclusive contract with one agent.
6We discuss imperfect learning in the conclusion section.
5introduced by Lewis and Sappington (1993), and it allows us to focus on the information
content of planning activity that is critical in making implementation decisions.7
To make planning or information gathering relevant in our model, we impose the fol-
lowing assumptions. The ￿rst two assumptions make information valuable to the principal
while the last assumption makes information valuable to the agent. The last assumption
also implies that the principal faces a moral hazard problem in the planning task followed
by an adverse selection problem in the implementation task.
￿ If the choice were available, the principal would prefer to hire an informed agent rather
than an uninformed agent.8
￿ The planning cost c is small enough that it is optimal to induce information gathering.
￿ The information gathered by the agent is private and unveri￿able and the act of
information gathering is not observable to the principal.
We assume that A2 cannot gather information on β.9 Thus, the contract with A2 is
only for the implementation task. The reservation payoﬀs for all parties are assumed to be
zero, and the agents are protected from termination penalties by limited liability protection
in that they are free to leave the principal￿s employment at any time.10
7This type of information has also been referred to as productive by CrØmer, Khalil, and Rochet (1998a).
See also CrØmer, Khalil, and Rochet (1998b) for the case where information gathering is for strategic reasons
only.
8His payoﬀ from dealing with an informed agent is derived from the Baron-Myerson contract, while his














∗(￿ β)) − ￿ βq
∗(￿ β).
It is possible that this condition does not hold. For more on this issue, see CrØmer, Khalil, and Rochet
(1998a).
9Instead, we could have assumed that A2 can also gather information at some cost. We discuss this
issue in detail in the conclusion section, and here we brie￿y outline the intuition. The principal could hire
possibly a sequence of agents, each facing a possibility of termination. However, it is not diﬃcult to see
that as long as planning cost is positive, there will always be a ￿nal agent who will be induced to implement
the project without acquiring information. In our model, we simply assume that A2 is the ￿nal agent.
10We assume limited termination penalties, which are common in practice (see for instance Sappington
(1983)). Technically, this assumption allows us to avoid a trivial solution of moral hazard with risk neutral
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Figure 1: The timing of the game
The timing of the interaction between the principal and agents goes as follows. Under
symmetric information, the principal oﬀers or commits to contracts for both agents. Then
A1 decides whether to acquire information about β at cost c. After the planning task, A1
makes a public report of his ￿nding ￿ β ∈ [β, ﬂ β] which does not have to be truthful since infor-
mation is private and unveri￿able. Based on this announcement and the given contracts,
either A1 implements the project or he is separated and A2 is invited to implement. We
summarize the timing of the game in Figure 1 and present details of the principal￿s contract
oﬀers to A1 and A2 in the next section.
3 The task-design problem
In this section, we ￿rst explain contract oﬀers to A1 and A2 in detail and derive the
constraints faced by the principal in his contract oﬀers. We then state the principal￿s
problem and show the optimal contract in a situation where a project has two phases:
planning and implementation. A key ￿nding of the paper is the non-monotonicity in
implement the project on their own outside the employment of the principal. This could be due to ￿nancial
limitations, lack of expertise in creating value, or clauses in employees￿ contracts. If they could, ￿selling
the project￿ could be an option for the principal, or there would be countervailing incentives. In particular,
there would be reward for acquiring planning information independent of those provided by the principal.
7the value of information function presented in proposition 1. This implies that partial
integration of tasks provides the strongest incentive to acquire planning information and
that partial integration is optimal.
3.1 Contracting with A1
The contract to A1 is a menu {q1(￿ β),t 1(￿ β),r(￿ β)} consisting of project size, associated pay-
ments, and an indicator of integration. However, from existing results in related models,11
it is clear that the indicator r(￿ β) c a nb er e p l a c e dw i t hab r e a k - o u tr u l eβs ∈ [β, ﬂ β], in that
the tasks are integrated for ￿ β ≤ βs,i . e . ,A1 is asked to produce q1(￿ β) a n di sp a i dat r a n s f e r
t1(￿ β). If ￿ β>β s, tasks are separated and the principal contracts with A2 to implement
the project, while A1 receives and produces zero. This follows immediately from incentive
compatibility for the agent, and we also derive it formally as lemma 1 in the appendix. We
can de￿ne the region or degree of integration by the interval [β,βs]. Note that since A2
cannot acquire information, it is without loss of generality to not base A1￿s contract on
q2.12
Given this contract, A1￿s payoﬀ from reporting ￿ β ≤ βs when the true marginal cost is
β is given by
U1(￿ β|β)=t1(￿ β) − βq1(￿ β), (3)
and for reporting ￿ β>β s, his payoﬀ is zero. The revelation principle is applicable in this
set up, and the following incentive compatibility constraint holds in equilibrium:
U1(β) ≥ U1(￿ β|β) ∀￿ β,β, (IC)
where U1(β)
def = U1(β|β). Participation requires that13
U1(β) ≥ 0 ∀β. (IR)
When A1 decides whether to gather information, he compares his payoﬀ with and with-
out information. If A1 becomes informed of the marginal cost β, then (IC) implies that
11See e.g., Riordan and Sappington (1989), and Laﬀont and Tirole (1988).
12The contract oﬀer to A1 could be made contingent not only ￿ β but also q2,w h i c hi st h eo n l yv e r i ￿able
outcome from a contract with A2. However, since A2 does not gather information about β, q2 is also at
best contingent on A1￿s report ￿ β. Thus, the contract contingent on ￿ β and q2 is equivalent to the contract
contingent on ￿ β only.
13In cases where A1 is separated, the participation constraint is a zero liability constraint.
8he will receive U1(β).I f A1 does not acquire information, he will still have to make an an-
nouncement ￿ β. Then, (IC) implies that he cannot do better than reporting ￿ β, the mean of
the distribution, which will yield him U1(￿ β).14 We can then de￿ne the value of information
to the agent by
vI def = E[U1(β)] − U1(￿ β),
which is the diﬀerence in the agent￿s expected payoﬀ with and without information. Since
information is valuable to the principal, the optimal contract will need to satisfy the fol-
lowing information gathering constraint to induce A1 to perform the planning task:
vI ≥ c. (IG)
A1 will gather information if the value of information is larger than the planning cost c.
Note that the agent faces two costs of acquiring information, the explicit cost c, and the
opportunity cost captured as U(￿ β), the rent he would get by remaining uninformed. Note
a l s ot h a tt h ep r i n c i p a lw i l ln o tb ea b l et od i s tinguish between an uninformed agent and an
informed agent who happens to discover that the true state is ￿ β. We will see below that
this constrains the principal in the provision of incentives and plays a critical role behind
one of our main ￿ndings that the value of information to the agent is non-monotonic in βs.
To summarize, the optimal contract with A1 must satisfy the constraints (IR), (IC),
and (IG) to induce participation, truthful revelation, and information gathering, respec-
tively. We next move to the contract with A2.
3.2 Contracting with A2
The principal invites A2 to implement the project when A1 reports ￿ β>β s. Given the (IG)
constraint, the principal knows that A1 will acquire information about the true β.15 If A1
learns that β<β s, (IC) implies that he will strictly prefer to report truthfully. If he learns
that β>β s, he will strictly prefer to report ￿ β>β s and obtain zero, rather than report









U1(￿ β|￿ β)=U1(￿ β),
where the ￿nal step follows from (IC).
15The (IG) constraint plays an important role in the principal￿s inference problem. If (IG) were not
satis￿ed and βs < ￿ β, the principal could not even infer if A1 was informed since an uninformed A1 would
also be indiﬀerent between announcing any ￿ β ∈ (βs, ﬂ β], including ￿ β.
9￿ β<β s and earn a negative payoﬀ. However, since his payoﬀ is identically equal to zero
for all ￿ β>β s,A 1 is indiﬀerent between any report ￿ β ∈ (βs, ﬂ β].16 Therefore, when the
principal hears a report ￿ β>β s, he can only infer that the report must be coming from an
informed A1 and that the true β ∈ (βs, ﬂ β], nothing more.17 This creates an endogenous
separation cost due to information loss, which is novel to the literature. This separation
cost will decrease as the region of separation shrinks and will disappear for βs close to ﬂ β.18
Therefore, the principal and A2 contract under symmetric beliefs that β is drawn from
the interval (βs, ﬂ β] according to the density fs(β)=
f(β)
1−F(βs), and that the expected marginal






Then, the contract with A2 is ex ante eﬃcient for the interval (βs, ﬂ β]:
q2 = q∗(￿ βs),
t2 = ￿ βsq∗(￿ βs),
but project size q2 and the transfer t2 do not change with realized β since the state is
unknown for β>β s. For later use, we denote by M(￿ βs) the principal￿s surplus from this
contract at each β, where
M(￿ βs)
def = V (q∗(￿ βs)) − ￿ βsq∗(￿ βs).
Even though A2￿s expected rent is zero, note that there is a cost of task separation due to
information loss. Separation implies that the size of the project cannot be made contingent
on the true β over the interval (βs, ﬂ β]. However, note that this loss disappears as βs becomes
very close to ﬂ β. This is because almost no uncertainty remains when contracting with A2 on
the ￿small￿ interval (βs, ﬂ β], and the principal and A2 contract under almost full information.
16In equilibrium, U(βs)=0 , so A1 will be indiﬀerent between all ￿ β ∈ [βs, ﬂ β] when he discovers a β>β s.
17This way of modeling also represents the case where the principal is restricted to using an indirect
mechanism t1(q1) without possibility of communication. In such a case, no information about β would be
revealed when there is separation.
18In contrast, if we assumed that A1￿s report is truthful when he is indiﬀerent between any report ￿ β ∈
(βs, ﬂ β], as in Riordan and Sappington (1989), there would be no loss from separation. We show in section 4
that partial integration would be still optimal.
103.3 Partial task-integration to increase the value of information
We are now ready to present the principal￿s optimization problem. Since we have already
identi￿ed the optimal contract with A2, here we only need to characterize the optimal con-









s.t. (IR),(IC),(IG),and β ≤ βs ≤ ﬂ β.
Except for the information gathering constraint (IG), the principal faces a Baron-
Myerson or informed-agent problem for β ≤ βs, i.e., the agent will earn a rent, but the
project size can be made contingent on the realized state. On the complementary interval,
β>β s, the principal receives the ex ante ￿rst-best payoﬀ, i.e., no (expected) rent is paid,
but the project size is insensitive to the realized state due to the loss of information. If
not for the (IG) constraint, the optimal task design would balance the trade-oﬀ between
information rent and the loss of information. Our key contributions rely on the eﬀect of
the binding (IG) constraint. The main results are summarized in the proposition below.
Proposition 1 (a) The value of information vI is strictly positive for βs >βand non-
monotonic in the region of integration: it increases with βs for βs < ￿ β, but decreases with
βs for βs > ￿ β. (b) Partial task-integration is optimal, i.e., β <β s < ﬂ β.
Proof. See the appendix.
Before providing intuition behind these results, we brie￿y explain why our result of
partial integration diﬀers from the result of full separation identi￿ed in Lewis and Sap-
pington (1997). The key diﬀerence is due to the fact that in their model the project cost
is observable. In particular, the observable implementation cost incurred by A2 can pro-
vide information about the truthfulness of A1￿s report.19 With full task separation and
cost-based payments, the principal can use the correlation of the realized cost and the true
cost parameter to costlessly discipline A1 for acquiring and revealing information. In our
model, since only the project size q is observable and not the project cost βq, the principal
19It is because A2 does not have an incentive to shirk since A2 and the principal contract under symmetric
information and cost-based payments are used.
11is not able to verify the truthfulness of A1￿s report.20 Then A1 would prefer not to acquire
information and just collect the planning cost c if there were full separation. This implies
that full separation does not occur in equilibrium in our model. The only way to induce
A1 to acquire and reveal information is then by having some integration and letting him
earn rent in those states. Furthermore, we show that partial integration is optimal since it
provides the strongest planning incentives.
The ￿rst point in part (a) of the proposition follows from a well-known property of
incentive compatibility constraints (IC) which implies that U (β) is convex. Then Jensen￿s
inequality establishes the result that the expected utility of β is larger than the utility of
expected β.
Non-monotonicity of the value of information is more subtle. The value of information
initially increases with the region of integration since A1 obtains rents in more states. How-
ever, as the region of integration increases further so that A1 would be invited to implement
the project even when he is not informed, the value of information falls. To understand
the latter, remember that the value of information is the bene￿t of becoming informed,
E [U (β)], minus the opportunity cost, U(￿ β), the rent of A1 when he is uninformed; A1 will
claim to have learned ￿ β if he remains uninformed. Since the principal cannot distinguish
between an uninformed agent and an informed agent who learns ￿ β, an uninformed agent
also earns a positive rent, U(￿ β), as the region of integration expands beyond ￿ β.T h ev a l u e
of information falls with integration beyond ￿ β as the opportunity cost increases for sure
whereas the bene￿t of becoming informed increases in expectation.
Given the non-monotonicity of the value of information vI as a function of βs, part (b)
readily follows. The planning agent has to be invited to implement the project suﬃciently
often to induce planning eﬀort, but inviting him too often would discourage planning eﬀort
since the opportunity cost of being informed becomes larger. Furthermore, the principal
will also experience an initial eﬃciency gain by reducing the region of integration from full
integration (βs = ﬂ β) since the contract with A2 is almost fully eﬃcient for β close to ﬂ β.21
Notice that partial integration is optimal even when the (IG) constraint is not binding,
20Thus, the two approaches can be reconciled if βq, instead of q, were observable and contractible in our
model. Of course, if both q and βq are observable in our model, there is no agency cost, and the task-design
problem is therefore vacuous.
21Under full integration (βs = ﬂ β), the optimal contract is the Baron-Myerson contract, which involves
yielding rent to the agent and distortion in project size given by (2).
12i.e., when the need to induce planning eﬀort is not an issue. Then, the principal chooses
the degree of integration to balance the trade-oﬀ between yielding information rent in case
of integration and the cost due to loss of information in case of separation without consid-
ering the need to induce planning eﬀort. However, if the (IG) constraint is binding, the
non-monotonicity in vI pushes the optimal degree of integration toward the mean of the
states.
This eﬀect can be emphasized by looking at the comparative statics with respect to the
planning cost c (see the appendix for the formal derivation of the comparative statics). An
increase in planning cost c implies that vI will have to be increased if the (IG) constraint is
binding. Given the non-monotonic shape of the vI function, this is achieved by increasing
βs if βs < ￿ β, and decreasing βs if βs > ￿ β. Thus, the consideration of the provision of
planning incentives makes βs close to ￿ β.
Finally, having discussed the role of degree of integration, we now brie￿y describe how
the optimal project size q1 (β), given by (13) in the appendix, is chosen to address the need
to provide incentive for the planning task as summarized in the following corollary.
Corollary 1 For β ≤ ￿ β, the optimal project size q1 (β) under integration, given by (13), is
larger than or equal to the Baron-Myerson level qb (β). For β>￿ β,it is smaller than or
equal to qb (β), provided that βs > ￿ β.
Proof. It immediately follows from comparing (2) to (13).
If the (IG) constraint is not binding, the need to induce planning eﬀort is not an issue,
and it is easy to see that the optimal project size equals the Baron-Myerson level: q1 (β)=
qb (β) for β ≤ βs, where qb (β) is de￿ned in (2). So, the question of interest is how the
project size will diﬀer from the Baron-Myerson level when (IG) is binding. The project
size would be distorted from qb (β) to increase vI. Increasing q1 (β) increases the bene￿t
of becoming informed, E [U (β)], but if β>￿ β it increases for certain the opportunity cost
of becoming informed, U(￿ β),a sw e l l . T h u s ,t h eo p t i m a lq1 (β) is made larger than qb (β)
for β<￿ β and smaller than qb (β) for β>￿ β. Of course, q1 (β) for β>￿ β is only relevant
if βs > ￿ β since A1 does not implement the project for β>β s. We note that, just as in
Lewis and Sappington (1997), for large enough planning costs, the project size may even
be increased above the ￿rst best level q∗ (β) for β<￿ β.22
22One interesting diﬀerence, however, is that in our model with a continuum of types, the uninformed
134 Extensions and conclusion
We have argued that integration of tasks can be a useful incentive tool to provide incentive
for planning activity that results in unobservable information, but it is partial integration
of tasks that provides stronger incentives. The key was in exposing the shape of the value
of information function, which is non-monotonic in the region of integration.
In our model there is a separation cost due to information loss, which would be absent
if we had assumed that A1 announces truthfully when he is indiﬀerent between announcing
diﬀerent states. By exploring this assumption here, we are able to clarify further the role
of cost observability and re-emphasize what Lewis and Sappington (1997) have shown:
cost-based contracts can achieve two things simultaneously at zero incentive cost ￿ induce
truthful information revelation and also provide incentive for planning eﬀort. If cost is not
observable, as we have assumed, even if A1 announces truthfully when he is separated,
there would be partial integration because some integration is necessary to induce planning
eﬀort. However, since there would be perfect information when contracting with A2, this
contract would be fully eﬃcient and the principal would prefer to separate earlier, i.e., the
region of integration would be smaller.23
A comparison of our model with that of Lewis and Sappington￿s oﬀers a testable im-
plication regarding the degree of integration-separation. We can expect a greater degree of
task-separation in projects where the project outcome can be used to infer the outcome of
planning activity, all else the same. For example, our analysis suggests that it is more likely
that a ￿rm will outsource the planning phase of a project (full separation) if the project
outcome or cost can be used to provide incentives for planning. As we argued at the outset,
this is likely to happen, for instance, if the cost data is transparent, and implementation
does not occur with a long lag. Otherwise, the ￿rm is likely to choose an inside agent to
perform both planning and implementation. Our analysis also suggests that tasks are more
agent￿s incentive to announce ￿ β remains unchanged as c increases, whereas it does change in Lewis and
Sappington (1997) in their binary setup, which results in the super high-powered reward structure.
23Other than the objective function, the principal￿s problem would be identical to that in section 3.3. The
objective function is changed to re￿ect the absence of information loss:
Z βs
β




where M(β)=[ V (q
∗(β)) − βq
∗(β)], is the ex post rather than the ex ante eﬃcient surplus M(￿ βs).
14likely to be separated in traditional, well-established industries, while they are more likely
to be integrated in new, fast-changing, and emerging industries. Due to the lack of previous
experiences, comparable examples or stereotypes, the project outcome in new industries can
hardly be used to infer the outcome of planning activity.
Our analysis can be extended in several directions. First, we assumed that A2 cannot
gather information. This would be the case where A1 has a signi￿cant comparative advan-
tage in information gathering over other agents available to the principal, or where there is
not enough time for planning once A1 has done his task. If A2 could also gather informa-
tion on β and this information could be used to contract with A1, the principal could use
correlated information to write a more eﬃcient contract with A1 as is well known.24 On
the other hand, if A2￿s information gathering is not observable, the principal may face a
similar contracting situation with A2 as he did with A1, but with one notable diﬀerence.
Information is less valuable to the principal since the interval of uncertainty has shrunk.
This captures the notion that we often learn something even when the ￿r s te x p e r tw ei n t e r -
act with is not the one eventually hired to complete the job. In general, CrØmer, Khalil,
and Rochet (1998a) have shown that the principal may want to induce or deter an agent to
gather information and characterized the optimal contracts that achieve those objectives.
The novel part here is that while information acquisition is desirable when contracting with
A1, it may not be when contracting with A2. Since A1 narrows down the range of unknown
possibilities, it may not be necessary to incur information gathering cost a second time by
inducing A2 to gather information. We can extend our model further to the case where the
principal faces a sequence of agents who can gather information. The number of agents who
will be brought into the planning task decreases with the planning cost. Put diﬀerently,
the cheaper the planning cost, the more agents will be involved sequentially in the planning
task. This has implications regarding the size of the ￿rm in information production.
Second, instead of exclusive contracting for the planning task, the principal could bring
multiple agents into a spot competition. For instance, if the planning task could be auc-
tioned oﬀ, as in the second-sourcing model of Riordan and Sappington (1989), rent to the
24See Lewis and Sappington (1997) or CrØmer and McLean (1985) for the correlated information argu-
ment. Gromb and Martimort (2003) present a principle of incentives for expertise, which says that an
expert or planning agent is rewarded if his recommendation is either con￿rmed by facts or other experts￿
recommendations. See Wolinsky (2002) and references therein for costs associated eliciting information from
multiple experts or planning agents.
15planning agent would no longer be costly to the principal. In that case, the (ex ante iden-
tical) agents would bid away the expected rent. If information gathering constraint were
not binding, there would be full-integration since there would be no cost of integration, and
providing incentive to gather information would not be an issue. However, if information
gathering constraint were binding, partial integration would again be optimal in order to
provide proper incentives for the planning task. Note that the project size would now be
distorted from the full-information level rather than the Baron-Myerson level.
Third, we can allow A1 to choose planning eﬀort from a continuum and allow the eﬀort
choice to determine the probability of becoming informed, which introduces the possibility
that A1 is uninformed in equilibrium. Would this alter the information gathering constraint,
the key to the shape of the value of information function, and aﬀect our main results? We
can argue that it would not. The properties of the value of information that we have
identi￿ed remain the same even in this framework, and partial integration is going to again
provide the strongest incentive for planning eﬀort.25
Finally, in addition to the separation cost due to loss of information, we could have
also included a ￿xed separation cost due to the operational costs of switching the agents
as in Riordan and Sappington (1989). In that case, given that this additional separation
cost is not too high, partial integration would still be optimal if the information gathering
constraint is binding. Full integration can occur only if the information gathering constraint
is not binding. The additional separation cost makes separation more costly, which creates
a possibility for full integration to be optimal. This may indeed happen when the need to
induce planning eﬀort is not an issue, but if the information gathering constraint is binding,
the non-monotonicity in the value of information will again imply that some separation is
needed to raise the value of information.
In the paper, we abstracted from issues of comparative advantage by assuming that
agents are equally productive in implementation. In reality comparative advantage plays
25To see this formally, suppose, as in Lewis and Sappington (1993) and Kessler (1998), that A1 is in-
formed with probability p, w h i l eh er e c e i v e san u l ls i g n a ls0 with probability (1 − p). Planning eﬀort
consists of choosing p at cost ψ(p), where this cost function is convex, and A1 chooses p to maximize
[pEU(β)+( 1− p)U(s0) − ψ(p)]. We will have U(s0)=U(￿ β) in equilibrium, and the agent￿s ￿rst order
condition for planning eﬀort is given by EU(β) − U(￿ β)=ψ
0(p). It shows that compared to the discrete
planning eﬀort model we used, the value of information function is virtually the same, but a ￿xed constant
planning cost is replaced with an increasing marginal cost of planning eﬀort.
16an obvious role in the allocation of tasks. Also, standard incentive schemes can be applied
for planning activity to the extent that outcomes of planning activity are observable. Our
analysis comes to bear as this outcome becomes diﬃcult to trade upon and compensation for
planning activity cannot be based on information revealed in the implementation process.
Appendix
Before proceeding to prove lemma 1, it is useful to formally de￿ne the principal￿s integration-
separation decision as r(￿ β) ∈ {0,1}, which is an indicator of whether the principal chooses
integration (r(￿ β)=1 ) or separation (r(￿ β)=0 ) contingent on A1￿s report.
Lemma 1 There exists βs ∈ [β, ﬂ β], such that r(￿ β)=1for ￿ β ≤ βs and r(￿ β)=t1(￿ β)=0
for ￿ β>β s.
Proof. We will show the following: if r(β0)=0 , for β0 ∈ [β, ﬂ β], then r(β)=0for
all β>β 0. Given that β00 >β 0 and r(β0)=0 , suppose to the contrary that r(β00)=1 .
For incentive compatibility, U1(β00) ≥ U1(β0|β00) and U1(β0) ≥ U1(β00|β0). Since U1(β0)=
U1(β0|β00)=t1(β0), the above implies U1(β00) ≥ U1(β00|β0), which is a contradiction because
U1(β00)=t1(β00) − β00q1(β00),
U1(β00|β0)=t1(β00) − β0q1(β00),
β0 <β 00, and q1(β00) > 0. Since q1(￿ β)=0when r(￿ β)=0 , t1(￿ β) is constant for ￿ β>β s.T h e n
it is optimal for the principle to set t1(￿ β)=0for ￿ β>β s.
P r o o fo fp r o p o s i t i o n1




1(β) ≤ 0, (5)
where (4) is obtained from (IC) using the envelope theorem and (5) is the associated second


























1 if β>￿ β and βs > ￿ β,
0 otherwise.














> 0 if βs < ￿ β,
< 0 otherwise,
which proves the second point in part (a). Given the shape of vI,t h e￿rst point in part (a)
follows from the facts that vI =0for βs = β and that vI > 0 for βs = ﬂ β .
For the proof of part (b), we use the incentive constraints (4), (5), and lemma 1, to
express the individual rationality constraint as follows:
U1(βs) ≥ 0. (9)




F(β) − 1￿ β
i
q1(β)dβ ≥ c. (10)
Using the de￿nition of U1(β) and lemma 1, we can replace t1(β) in the principal￿s objective

















s.t. (5),(9),(10), and β ≤ βs ≤ ﬂ β.
18From this, it must be the case that the constraint (9) is binding, i.e., U1(βs)=0 ,s i n c e





q1(s)ds ∀β ≤ βs.


























Pointwise optimization yields the optimality condition for q1(β):




F(β) − 1￿ β
f(β)
∀β ≤ βs, (13)
when q1(β) is monotonic. Notice that if λ>1, over-investment occurs in that q1(β) given
by (13) is larger than q∗
1(β) for β<￿ β. However, if λ>1, the standard hazard rate
assumption may not guarantee the monotonicity of q1 (β) given by (13). In such a case, we
would have bunching on q1 (β) since incentive compatibility would be violated otherwise.
Since the Lagrangian (12) may not be well behaved in βs, a standard ￿rst order condition
for βs cannot be immediately used. However, note that we only need to show that we do
not have corner solutions in βs when the (IG) is binding. If (IG) is binding, λ>0, and
we must have c>0; then (10) implies that βs >β .N e x tw ea r g u et h a tβs < ﬂ β. Suppose




which is the full-information surplus at ﬂ β. Therefore, the derivative of (12) with respect of





















Condition (13) implies that the optimal q1(ﬂ β)=qb ¡ﬂ β
¢
if βs = ﬂ β. Therefore the above
derivative is strictly negative, which contradicts βs = ﬂ β a n dw eh a v ec o m p l e t e dt h ep r o o f .
19Comparative statics






















F(β) − 1￿ β
f(β)
q1(β).
Assuming that the Lagrangian is well behaved around the optimal βs and that q1(β) is
monotonic, the solution satis￿es:


























F(β) − 1￿ β
i
q1(β,λ)dβ.N o t et h a t
∂￿ βs
∂βs > 0.
If λ =0 , there is no eﬀect of a change in c on βs.I fλ>0, (16) becomes an equality.
Then the eﬀect of c c a nb ec a p t u r e db yt h ef o l l o w i n g :
(Ys − Ms − Hs)
∂βs
∂c




+ Gλλc =1 , (18)
where the subscripts, s,λ, and c, represent the derivatives with respect to them. From





> 0 if βs < ￿ β





> 0 if βs < ￿ β
< 0 if βs > ￿ β
.
We also know that Gλ > 0, and the local SOC implies that Ys − Ms − Hs ≤ 0.
T a k et h ec a s eo fβs < ￿ β ￿rst. Suppose that
∂βs
∂c < 0. Then (17) implies that λc ≤ 0,
but then (18) implies that
∂βs
∂c ≥ 0, which leads a contradiction. So we must have that
∂βs
∂c ≥ 0 for βs < ￿ β, which implies that λc ≥ 0. Next, consider the case βs > ￿ β. Suppose
that
∂βs
∂c > 0. Then (17) implies that λc ≤ 0, but then (18) implies that
∂βs
∂c ≤ 0, which is
a contradiction. So we must have that
∂βs
∂c ≤ 0 for βs > ￿ β.
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